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Abstract 
With the passing of time and the benefit of hindsight there is, again, growing interest in Thatcherism 
– above all in its substantive and enduring legacy.  But, to date at least, and largely due to data 
limitations, little of that work has focussed on tracing the behavioural consequences, at the 
individual level, of holding Thatcherite values.  That oversight we seek both to identify more clearly 
and to begin to address.  Deploying new survey data, we use multiple linear regression and 
structural equation modelling to unpack the relationship between ‘attitudinal’ and ‘behavioural’ 
Thatcherism.  In the process we reveal the considerably greater behavioural consequences of 
holding neo-liberal, as distinct from neo-conservative, values whilst identifying the key mediating 
role played by social, political and economic nostalgia.  We find that neo-liberal values are positively 
associated with Behavioural Thatcherism, whilst neo-conservative values are negatively associated 
with Behavioural Thatcherism. In exploring the implications we also reveal some intriguing 
interaction effects between economic nostalgia and neo-conservative values in the centre-left vote 
for Brexit.  In the conclusion we reflect on the implications of these findings for our understanding of 
the legacy of Thatcherism and, indeed, for Brexit itself.   
Keywords: Brexit; Thatcherism; nostalgia;  
 
Introduction 
‘What is Thatcherism?’ was a question to which much attention was focused during the late-
1980s and 1990s.  Various contributors saw Thatcherism as a Janus-faced phenomenon, 
flexibly combining the seemingly contradictory combination of a liberal and/or liberalising 
disposition with a socially conservative instinct (Gamble 1988; Hayes 1994).  Later termed 
‘neo-liberalism’ and ‘neo-conservativism’, these twin ideational pillars came to be seen as 
key building blocks of a distinct New Right approach to the economy and society (Hay 1996; 
King 1987; Levitas 1986).  Contemporaneously with her period as Prime Minister, many of 
the studies of Thatcherism, as we shall see below, focused on the social and economic 
attitudes which were assumed to be associated with this doctrine. The social and economic 
policies pursued by the Thatcher governments also came under scrutiny, as well as research 
on which socio-demographic groups were sufficiently attracted to the vision espoused by 
Thatcher and her supporters to vote conservative.  
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Our contribution to this literature, almost three decades after Margaret Thatcher left office, 
is to explore the longer-term and behavioural legacy of Thatcherism.  By this we mean the 
daily, mundane and taken-for-granted ways in which the attitudinal values associated with 
Thatcherism came, and continue, to inform lived social, political and economic practices in 
Britain today.  Our working assumption is that, with the accretion of time and with the slow 
institutionalisation and ideational embedding of Thatcherite norms via reforms conducted in 
its image, social practices in keeping with core Thatcherite tenets have evolved.  This 
process, we suggest, is likely to leave (indeed, to have left) enduring (and empirically 
identifiable) behavioural traces in both the ways in which people’s lives are shaped and, 
above all, in what they desire and strive for.   
In order to assess this empirically, we draw on new survey data collected as part of an ESRC-
funded project.  Alongside a series of questions designed to gauge the degree of 
Behavioural Thatcherism (reported behaviour consistent with Thatcherite values), we also 
asked respondents about their beliefs relating to the economy and social norms, Margaret 
Thatcher’s time in office, and feelings of nostalgia.  Nostalgia has come to the fore in recent 
political science attempts to explain, for example, votes for radical right populist politicians, 
parties and social movements (Gest 2016).  Like Gest, we find evidence to support the claim 
that nostalgic values shape current political attitudes and beliefs.  
In the next section of this paper, we review how Thatcherism has been approached in 
previous studies.  Following this, we outline our thinking on Behavioural Thatcherism and 
the implicit conception of the model Thatcherite subject on which it seems to be predicated.  
We then outline our methodology and modelling strategy.  This includes outlining our 
operationalisation of Behavioural Thatcherism to gauge its prevalence in contemporary 
British society.  After this we explore the ways in which neoliberal and neo-conservative 
values, beliefs about Thatcherism and feelings of nostalgia are related to the markers of 
Behavioural Thatcherism.  Our modelling is then reported as repeated multiple linear 
regressions (with robust and appropriate controls for key socio-demographic variables) and 
a structural equation model of the conceptual variables.  Our paper concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of our findings. We suggest that a pronounced behavioural 
legacy of Thatcherism can be found and said to ‘exist’ in the day-to-day lives of ordinary 
Britons; neo-liberalism, in particular, remains a powerful and organising concept of social 
and political life.     
 
Conceptualising the Legacy of Thatcherism 
In the existing literature ‘Thatcherism’ has been approached by political scientists and 
political sociologists as, variously:  
(1) as an attitude;  
(2) as a set of social and economic policies; and  
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(3) as the act of voting for the Conservative Party whilst Margaret Thatcher was its 
leader (linked in turn to associated analyses concerning which social groups voted 
for the Conservative Party during this period).   
Let us consider each in turn.  
 
The Attitudinal Aspects of Thatcherism  
Some of the earliest forays into the impact of Thatcherism focused on attitudinal measures. 
One of the earliest surveys of attitudes towards Thatcherism was conducted in Manchester 
by researchers at the University of Salford (Edgell and Duke, 1991).  These surveys ran in 
late-1980 to early-1981 and again in late-1983 and early-1984, and found little by way of 
support for Thatcherite values.  The surveys suggested that respondents wanted increases 
in spending and taxation (rather than decreases, a tenet of what might be seen as the 
neoliberal aspect of Thatcherism) with an attendant drop in support for spending on the 
armed services (which would be against the expectations of what might been seen as a neo-
conservative element of Thatcherism).  The surveys also found high levels of support for 
local government (1991:81) although they also found support for curbing the power of trade 
unions (trade unions were still seen as being needed, however, 1991:83).  
Crewe and Searing (1988) asked ‘has the electorate become Thatcherite?’, to which they 
answered ‘no’, pointing out that by some analyses the population was taking a ‘hard line’ on 
some issues before 1979 and that by 1987 was actually showing quite anti-Thatcherite 
sentiments. They argued that there was little evidence that Thatcherite ideology had gained 
much popular support, although there were some signs that significant blocks such as the 
Monday Club had started to share some of the pillars of Thatcherism.  When it came to a 
consideration of the extent to which Thatcherite thinking was shared by the electorate, 
most of the dimensions of Thatcherism identified by Crewe and Searing suggested that the 
electorate had shifted little or had, in fact, become less Thatcherite (1988:376).  McAllister 
and Mughan (1987) concluded their study by suggesting that there had been “little 
fundamental change in the electorate’s overall attitudinal structure” (1987:47, our 
emphasis).  In short, initial shifts in attitudes which might become, in time, a legacy were 
simply not identified in the early literature on attitudinal change.  
From this point onwards the analyses started to become more sophisticated, with analysts 
starting to explore regional shifts, the notion of ‘political generations’ and to explore longer 
term trends in the data available by exploring the British Election Studies back to 1963.  
Johnston and Pattie (1990) were characteristic of this growing sophistication.  Although they 
conclude by arguing that “the Thatcherite project has failed, in that the majority of the 
electorate ... did not embrace its core values to any significant extent” (1990:492) they were 
able to show (using the 1983 and 1987 British Election Study surveys) that there were 
significant changes in some values at the level of the region (consistent with the idea of the 
opening of a political north-south cleavage). More recent studies, using longer term data 
series and more nuanced analytical techniques (such as age, period and cohort analyses, 
Grasso et al, 2019) have suggested that attitudinal effects can more readily be detected for 
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those who grew up during Thatcher’s period in office. These more recent studies provide 
evidence that the attitudinal legacy of Thatcherism may have taken several decades to 
emerge. 
 
Thatcherism as a Policy and Legislative Project  
Chief amongst the early work which approached Thatcherism as a policy and legislative 
agenda is Marsh and Rhodes’ seminal edited collection (1992).  Its innovation was to deal 
not simply with legislative activity, but with the much more complex and difficult work of 
implementation. The approach forced its contributors to consider the extent to which 
legislation and the policies which flowed from it was in keeping with Thatcherite ideals 
(rather than simply being passed or developed between 1979 and 1990).  Their approach to 
the operationalisation of the concept of Thatcherism embraces ideas, legislation and 
crucially the implementation of legislation.  Theirs, however, is very much a study of 
institutions and policies, rather than the impact upon individual citizens.  It stops short of 
considering the potential behavioural implications of the (partial) implementation of 
Thatcherite ideas in policies.   
The more recent literature in this strand of research tends to approach Thatcherism as 
something which existed (demonstratively) and which can be traced and its impact 
assessed.  Farrall and Hay’s edited collection The Legacy of Thatcherism (2014) contains a 
number of chapters which detail the operationalisation of Thatcherite ideas in distinct policy 
domains.  Its contributors deal with the economy, the social security system, schooling, 
housing and family policy, and the criminal justice system, setting each in the context of 
data on widening social and economic inequality.  Overall the approach maps the 
sequencing of policy outcomes, ideological positions, political ‘machinery’, organisational 
structures, the policy positions of other parties, the relative standing of some professions, 
and access to and/or the distribution of resources, whilst attending throughout to the 
uneven spatial distribution of each.  
Nunn (2014), taking a still broader approach, identifies four long-term outcomes of 
Thatcherism.  The first of these is the transformation of mainstream party competition and 
the creation of the New Labour project (see also Hay 1999; Heffernan 2000).  The second is 
the creation of the neo-liberal individual – part-citizen, part-consumer.  In this version of the 
project of the self, advancement is made via the possession of material goods as part of a 
wider possessive individualism.1  ‘Social mobility’ therefore before becomes an individual, 
rather than a collective, goal.  The third legacy which Nunn identifies is the de-
industrialisation experienced by the UK during the 1980s and the increased dependence on 
the financial sector (although as Nunn notes, de-industrialisation can be traced back to the 
1950s).  The final long-term outcome is the fracturing of the working class.  Nunn’s work in 
this field is one of the few to explicitly identify the creation of a ‘neo-liberal individual’ as a 
                                                          
1 On the concept of possessive individualism more generally, see Billing, 2018.  
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consequence of Thatcherism, and to assess the implication of the Thatcherite vision for 
society on the behaviour of the individuals in that society.  
A recent special edition of this journal (10/1) has helped push forward recent debates about 
Thatcher’s impact and the legacies which flow from this period.  In it, Jessop (2015) notes a 
number of diverse legacies of Thatcherism, including the rise of the conviction politician, the 
promotion of the free market, deregulation, privatisation of state-owned utilities and the 
introduction of market proxies in the state sector, reductions in direct taxation and the 
growth of internationalisation.  Each of these he sees as a product of the application of a 
Thatcherite disposition informing policy and legislative activity (p24).  Marsh and Akram 
(2015:55) point to changes in fiscal policies and legislative constraints on trade unions, but 
question the extent to which the Thatcher governments can be seen to have changed social 
values (citing Crewe’s work) and the extent to which there was an ‘economic miracle’ 
attributable to Thatcher’s policies (p57).  Smith (2015) highlights Thatcher’s role in 
undermining the broad policy framework and politically institutionalised rules which 
emphasised the need for conciliation and consensus (p65).  While being careful not to 
accept uncritically the idea of a post-war consensus, Smith argues that the Thatcher 
administrations started the process of re-visioning the responsibilities of the state and the 
interests it ought to serve (p69).  Similarly, he emphasises, subsequent governments have 
been able to change employment and welfare policies without having to enter into 
negotiations with the most directly affected parties (p76).  As such, the idea that 
concessions needed to be made to various sections of society was removed from the 
political calculus.  In a similar fashion, Green (2010:193-4) has argued that Thatcher 
transformed the institutional terrain of politics such that trade unions and local 
governments saw their powers reduced, a phobia of paying taxes emerged, and the state 
withdrew from any meaningful management of the economy.  Dorey (2015) focuses on 
levels of economic inequality as the main legacy of Thatcherism. This was legitimated 
ideationally by re-casting wealth as a reward for effort (p81) and a series of policies and 
supporting legislation (such as income tax reductions, curbing trade union power and 
various efforts to reduce the effective economic value of social security payments), driving 
up levels of inequality.  New Labour, he points out, focused on tackling poverty and social 
exclusion, rather than tackling inequality, which he cites as the principal enduring legacy of 
Thatcherism.  
 
Thatcherism as political (electoral) behaviour 
Another, mainly contemporaneous, set of studies focused on the socio-economic 
determinants of the vote for the Conservative Party during the 1980s.  Prime examples of 
this literature include (but are by no means limited to) Heath et al.’s classic study How 
Britain Votes (1985), which argued that Labour’s electoral base was withering as a result of 
deindustrialisation.  Riddell (1991:212) made a similar argument, noting that those living in 
the north, council tenants, union members and public sector employees had been declining 
at the expense of southern, owner occupiers in non-unionised, private sector occupations.  
McAllister and Mugahn (1987) is typical of much of this literature, in which various socio-
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demographic factors are cross-tabulated with voting preferences (1987:51).  Norris (1990) is 
a particularly sophisticated contribution to the literature, exploring the ownership of shares, 
private healthcare and council house purchasing and voting using data from the 1987 British 
Election Survey.  Johnson and Pattie’s work stands out as another exemplar of this type of 
work.  Their 1990 paper reports that 30% of the working class voted Conservative in the 
1983 and 1987 general elections, whilst also noting emerging regional differences in voting 
preferences.  Similarly, Edgell and Duke (1991:67) claim that the social bases of Thatcherism 
were relatively narrow, and were to be found amongst employers, the petit bourgeoisie, 
public sector managers and private consumption only households (that is, those households 
who owned cars and their own homes). 
 
Critiquing Current Approaches to Thatcherism 
Whilst the question of who voted Conservative during Thatcher’s tenure as party leader, 
Thatcherite attitudes, and the legacies of Thatcherite policies are common elements in the 
exploration of Thatcherism, few authors, with the exception of Nunn (2014), refer to (let 
alone trace empirically) the behavioural consequences at the level of the individual citizen. 
Thatcherism’s moral and moralising discourse was very much about behaviour and, indeed, 
the ethical evaluation of that behaviour. It is neatly summed up in a much quoted aphorism 
from an interview reported in The Times on May 7th 1988: “Economics are the method; the 
object is to change the soul”. In changing what she referred to as ‘the soul’, the aim was of 
course to change not just the soul, but the ways in which people behaved – and to judge the 
soul on the basis of the behaviour exhibited. Yet, aside from studies of voters’ reactions to 
the tenets of Thatcherism in the polling booths, there has been little or no attempt to study 
the ways in which Thatcherite ideologies, thinking and policies may have affected the day-
to-day behaviours of people living in the UK. The closest we get in the current literature 
which touches upon the behavioural elements of Thatcherism are to be found in Gamble’s 
discussion of increases in unemployment and the weakening of the Union in Scotland (both 
of which undoubtedly affected daily routines and voting patterns), and Nunn’s use of the 
concept of ‘possessive individualism’ and its consequences.  Most of the remaining 
literature on the legacy of Thatcherism deals with broad social attitudes and the changes in 
these, institutional and policy legacies (net of their impact on individual’s lives) and/or 
discursive legacies (on which see Phillips 1998).   
 
The Thatcherite Subject 
The basis for our thinking about the legacy of Thatcherism as having a strongly behavioural 
element (as well, of course, as attitudinal, institutional and policy legacies) is inspired by the 
literature on Thatcherite and neo-liberal individualism. Leadbeater (1989:141-144) is an 
early expondent of such a view, noting how Thatcherite individualism shaped people’s 
desires and actions. This body of work extends to other critiques of neo-liberalism more 
generally, such as Rose’s work on individual existence (1996) or Foucault’s on the self 
(2005), and Mitchell’s work on unemployed Australians (1995). However, we rely, in 
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particular, on the more recent work of French scholars Dardot and Laval (2013), and US 
political scientist Paul Pierson (1993).  Dardot and Laval’s work is an attempt to understand 
the ways in which what might be termed ‘the neoliberal project’ has shaped society and the 
key social actors within it.  They note that neoliberalism is  
“productive of certain kinds of social relations, certain ways of living, certain 
subjectivities. In other words, at stake in neo-liberalism is nothing more, nor less, 
than the form of our existence – the way in which we are led to conduct ourselves, to 
relate to others and ourselves” (2013:3).  
They go on to identify, as the principal characteristic of neo-liberalism, what they term 
‘competitive behaviouralism’ (p4).  Drawing upon the work of Foucault, they argue that 
neoliberalism is a form of ‘government of life’ (p4-5).  For this reason, they approach 
neoliberalism not simply as a set of prescriptions about economics or economic policy, but 
also as a societal form (p11).  Their sensitivity to politically-induced behavioural change is 
premised on the idea that neoliberalism has produced a new human condition (p255).  Key 
to this is the production of an individually-focussed spirit of competitiveness (p257), which 
involves not just the ‘training of bodies’ but the ‘management of minds’ (p258).  This 
conditions subjects to take personal responsibility for the making and taking of choices 
which are advantageous to them.  This new entrepreneurial subject is produced over time 
via various institutional forms and the fostering of competitive individualism in such new 
institutional environments (p259-260). They argue that:  
“neoliberal rationality produces the subject it requires by deploying the means of 
governing him [sic.] so that he really does conduct himself as an entity in a 
competition, who must maximise his results by exposing himself to risks and taking 
full responsibility for possible failures” (p261).    
They go on to suggest that this is a departure from earlier conditions since it 
“consists [of] the moulding whereby individuals are rendered more capable of 
tolerating the new conditions created for them – and this even though they help to 
make these conditions increasingly harsh and abiding through their own conduct. In 
a word, the novelty consists in triggering a ‘chain reaction’ by producing ‘enterprising 
subjects’ who in turn will reproduce, expand and reinforce competitive relations 
between themselves” (p262).  
Part of the discourse of competitive individualism is the production and reproduction of the 
self as an economic vehicle; one which needs to be continually updating and upgrading itself 
in readiness to meet the needs and requirement of the market place.  To this end, education 
and training, life-long learning and ensuring employability are the watchwords of the 
competitive individual.  This ‘care of the self’ extends to one’s loved ones too; children’s 
education and helping one’s partner retrain (if needed), alongside managing one’s 
employability portfolio, and responding to ‘choices’, ‘opportunities’ and ‘possibilities’, 
becomes part of the lifeworld of the competitive individual.  Choices are made on the basis 
of information made available about the successes associated with each provider; how 
many patients are happy with the treatment outcomes; how many learners go on to secure 
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relevant employment or the starting salaries of recent alumnae, and so forth.  This human 
capital (and the continual reinvestment in it) become associated with outcomes at the 
individual-level.  The positions which one achieves, the economic resources which one 
accumulates and the status one enjoys are seen as the consequences of decisions which 
individual makes and the trajectories of personal self-realisation (p275).  As such the 
distribution of resources is seen as the results of individual choices and actions, rather than 
the outcome of inter-generational or class-based processes.  Alongside this, argue Dardot 
and Laval, private insurance replaces socialised health care, pension and welfare schemes – 
as the field of action of the responsible choosing neoliberal subject grows and competitive 
individualism becomes institutionally embedded (p277). 
Writing 20 years before them, Pierson argues in a similar vein that: 
“Policies may encourage individuals to develop particular skills, make certain kinds of 
investments, purchase certain kinds of goods, or devote time and money to certain 
kinds of organizations” (1993:609). 
His central insight is that, “public policies also provide resources and create incentives for 
mass publics” (1993:605).  In line with Dardot and Laval, Pierson is pointing to the fact that 
social and economic policies shape what people want and are capable of doing in their 
everyday lives.  In part, this updates for an era of austerity earlier work by Esping-Andersen, 
who notes that:   
“The welfare state is becoming deeply embedded in the everyday experience of 
virtually every citizen. Our personal life is structured by the welfare state, and so is 
the entire political economy” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 141 cited in Pierson, 
1993:605-6). 
Thus, just as Pierson argues that 
“Welfare states provide resources and incentives to individuals that profoundly 
influence crucial life choices: what kind of job to take, when to retire or take time off 
from the paid labour force, how to organize and divide household tasks such as child 
rearing.” (1993:606) 
so we suggest that the shift to a more marketised society, and indeed the process of making 
that change to a marketised society, provides people with resources, incentives and the 
motivations to embrace new possibilities. Whilst the tenor of this is optimistic, the flipside is 
that it also forces people to confront the new realities facing them, and to cease to confront 
the institutional and organisational structures which had previously been presented to 
them.  These new realities and the institutions and organisations which are part of them, to 
quote Pierson again, “create powerful packages of resources and incentives that influence 
the positions of interest groups, government elites, and individual social actors in politically 
consequential ways” (1993:610).  
Our aim in what follows is to explore the ways in which the attitudinal structure of what we 
will term Thatcherite values shapes the sorts of behaviours which ordinary British citizens 
exhibit some 40 years after she was first elected Prime Minister.  However, in order to 
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understand Thatcherite values, we argue, one also needs to locate these within wider ideas 
about nostalgia (which we explore below) and the sense that something valued (in a mythic 
or real past) has been ‘lost’.    
 
Analytic and Methodological Strategy 
Our data comes from an online survey commissioned to assess the contemporary relevance 
of Thatcherite values and ideology on the 40th anniversary of the 1979 General Election.  It 
gathered responses from a representative sample of citizens aged over 16 living in Britain, 
and was conducted in January and February 2019 by BMG Research.  The survey had a non-
completion rate of 34%.2  Many (although not all) survey items were designed by the 
authors, following two rounds of cognitive interviewing, two field experiments and a pilot 
survey during 2018.  These were undertaken to refine key aspects of the items used and to 
facilitate a reflective discussion of potential question wordings.  
Our modelling strategy was to undertake factor analyses of variables in the batteries 
measuring key concepts (such as neoliberal values, or social nostalgia, all of which are 
outlined below).  These were then used in, first, multiple linear regression analyses (with 
suitable socio-demographic control variables) before moving to a structural equation model 
to assess the structural properties of the model being tested.  Below we outline the 
measurement of the key variables selected for analysis.    
 
Measuring and Exploring Behavioural Thatcherism 
Central to the analysis is the attempt to capture empirically the concept of ‘Behavioural 
Thatcherism’.  The items selected for this are listed in Figure One, and relate to a series of 
(behavioural) practices or to the direct consequences of those (behavioural) practices: 
owning one’s own business; owning stocks and shares; being covered by private health care 
schemes; attending oneself and/or sending one’s children to a private school; paying for 
additional tutoring for one’s children at school; owning ‘second homes’; and making use of 
league tables relating to educational and/or health care providers.  
 
FIGURE ONE: MEASURING BEHAVIOURAL THATCHERISM 
Item Wording 
Do you or a member of your household own (or co-own) a business? 
[tick all that apply] 
 
[Yes, myself, Yes, someone I live with, yes, no, Don’t know] 
                                                          
2 The figure of 34% includes those who did not participate following the invitation (29%), those who started 
but dropped out prior to completing the survey (4%), and those who were removed for completing survey at 
excessive speed (1%). Of the remaining 66%, 14% were willing to complete the survey, but were unable to as 
regional targets had been met, whilst 51% were able to complete the survey in full.    
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Do you or a member of your household own stocks or shares? 
 
[Yes, no, Don’t know] 
Are you yourself covered by a private health insurance scheme, that is, an insurance scheme 
that allows you to get private medical treatment? 
[tick all that apply] 
 
[Yes, paid for by my employer (or my partner’s); Yes, paid for by myself or my family; Yes, 
partly paid for by my employer and partly paid for by myself; Yes, other; No, I am not 
covered by private medical insurance]. 
Have you, or any of your children, ever attended a fee-paying school? 
 
[yes, just myself; yes, just my children; yes, both myself and my children; no neither of us].  
Excluding music lessons, have you ever paid for additional tutoring outside of school for any 
of your children for any of their school subjects?  
[tick all that apply] 
 
[Yes, for children still at school; Yes, for children who have now left school; No, but I would 
consider doing this; No; Not applicable] 
Do you, or anyone in your household, own any residential property in the UK or abroad 
which you do not permanently live in?  
[tick all that apply] 
 
Include properties that are let out to others, second homes, or which are co-owned with 
others. Exclude caravans, park homes and timeshares. 
 
[Yes, rented out to someone as their home; Yes, used as a holiday home/weekend cottage; 
Yes, rented to others as a holiday home; Yes, for occupation while working away from 
home; Yes, other; No]  
Have you ever used this sort of information [relating to making decisions about health care 
and schools based on league tables3] to make choices about which hospital or school to use?  
 
[tick all that apply] 
 
[Yes, schools, Yes, hospitals, Yes another public service, No].    
 
Respondents responses on items were summed (with each equally-weighted) and produced 
a further variable ranging from 0 (having done none of these) to 15 (since many items allow 
                                                          
3 Two questions immediately preceded this one, and were: 1: Some say that certain kinds of information 
should be made available to help people make informed choices about public services such as schools and 
hospitals. Others think that this information is irrelevant or cannot be trusted. How useful do you think it would 
be for someone choosing which surgeon to see to be given league tables that show the number of patients who 
have died under the care of different surgeons? and 2: How useful do you think it would be for someone 
choosing which school to send their child to to be given league tables that compare the exam results of 
secondary schools in their area? Both questions had the same response set: Very useful, quite useful, Not very 
useful, Not at all useful.  
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for multiple responses, even although there are only seven items the potential scale extends 
to 15). See Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF BEHAVIOURAL  
THATCHERISM SCORES 
Score N of Cases Percentage of Cases 
0 2308 40 
1 1556 27 
2 881 15 
3 484 8 
4 237 4 
5 139 2 
6 73 1 
7 56 1 
8 18 - 
9 14 - 
10 8 - 
11 2 - 
12 3 - 
13 1 - 
14 0 - 
15 1 - 
TOTAL 5781 100 
‘-‘ Indicates a percentage less than 1.   
On average, men scored slightly higher than women (1.38 vs. 1.28, p = .020). Similarly, the 
young scored higher than the elderly (16-24 year olds had an average of 1.68, which fell 
steady with age to 1.06 for those aged over 75, p = .000).  This is already intrgiguing, 
suggestive as it is of the increasing adoption of what we have termed Behavioural 
Thatcherism over time.  Behavioural Thatcherism, in other words, might be thought of as an 
incrementally-adopted cohort effect (Grasso et al 2019). There was no significant difference 
observed between those living in rural and urban areas (p = .843).  
 
Relating Behavioural Thatcherism to wider Thatcherite Values and Beliefs 
What might explain Thatcherite Behaviouralism? We developed a model based on the 
differentiation between two key streams in contemporary new right thinking – namely neo-
liberalism (Figure Two) and neo-conservativism (Figure Three).  Questions relating to both 
sets of items were posed to all respondents; all responses were coded in the same way and 
on a common scale.4  
                                                          
4 Respondents were invited to use the following scale: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; 
Disagree; Strongly disagree.  This scale was used for all questions unless otherwise noted. The items 





FIGURE TWO: NEO-LIBERAL ‘THATCHERITE’ VALUES 
Item Wording Loadings 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?   
Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation’s wealth. .599 
There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees’ working 
conditions and wages. 
.667 
Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems.  .644 
Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership. -.322 
It would be better for everyone if we all paid less tax. .356 
Welfare benefits should be reserved for only the extremely needy. .418 
 
These items were factor analysed to form one battery of items measuring neo-liberal values. 
The KMO was .757, and the eigenvalue was 2.288.5  The factor loadings ranged from -.322 to 
.667 and were all in the anticipated direction.  
FIGURE THREE: NEO-CONSERVATIVE ‘THATCHERITE’ VALUES 
Item Wording Loadings 
Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional values.  .666 
For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence. .604 
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. .753 
Schools should teach children to obey authority .681 
 
These items were factor analysed to form one battery of neo-conservative items.  The KMO 
was .760, and the eigenvalue was 2.369.  The factor loadings ranged from .604 to .753.  In 
addition to these two aggregate indices, we measured four other factors (Beliefs about 
Thatcherism; Social Nostalgia, Economic Nostalgia and Political Nostalgia), all of which are 
outlined below. 
The Beliefs about Thatcherism battery (Figure Four) assessed the extent to which 
respondents felt that Thatcher reversed the decline of the country, was right to sell council 
houses (a flagship policy), helped to ensure better lives for all people, made decisions which 
were needed (even if there were some people who lost out), was right to tackle trade 
                                                          
neo-liberalism and (see Figure Three) neo-conservativism, and were then analysed using exploratory factor 
analysis (which confirmed that these items loaded together).  
5 The KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) Test is a measure of how suited the data is for Factor Analysis. The test 
measures sampling adequacy for each variable in the model and for the complete model. KMO values range 
between 0 and 1. A rule of thumb for interpreting the statistic is that KMO values between 0.8 and 1 indicate 
the sampling is adequate, whilst those below 0.6 indicate the sampling is not adequate and that remedial 
action should be taken. The lowest KMO for our factor analyses was .722, suggesting that all of these had 




unions (another major policy area), looked after the interests of only the rich (a criticism of 
her governments, then and now), and left a legacy of housing shortages. The battery also 
assesses the extent to which respondents believe that private companies are better able to 
run utilities than state-owned enterprises (another major policy development pursued by 
Thatcher’s government). These items were factor analysed to form one battery of items. 
The KMO was .890, and the eigenvalue was 4.465. The factor loadings ranged from -.467 to 
.894.  
FIGURE FOUR: BELIEFS ABOUT THATCHER/THATCHERISM 
Item Wording Loadings 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
Margaret Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister? 
 
Margaret Thatcher made Britain Great again. .869 
Margaret Thatcher was right to sell council houses to tenants. .576 
Private companies run utilities like gas, electricity and water better than the 
government ever could. 
.481 
The social and economic changes since the 1980s have ensured a brighter 
future for all. 
.715 
Although there were some losers, overall the changes Margaret Thatcher’s 
governments made were necessary. 
.894 
Margaret Thatcher was right to take on trade unions.  .805 
Margaret Thatcher only looked after the interests of the rich.  -.716 




We asked a further thirteen questions designed to gauge the degree of expressed nostalgia 
of respondents, differentiating in the process between social, economic and political 
dimensions of nostalgia (see Figures Five to Seven).  
FIGURE FIVE: SOCIAL NOSTALGIA BATTERY 
Item Wording Loadings 
The country’s best days are behind it.  .466 
I would like my country to be the way it used to be.  .711 
More and more, I don’t like with what my country has become. .609 
These days I feel like a stranger in my own country. .704 
I feel sad when I think about how areas like the … one I grew up in have 
changed. 
.837 




The Social Nostalgia battery (Figure Five) asked respondents the extent to which they felt 
the country’s best days were behind it, if they preferred their country to be ‘the way it used 
to be’, the extent to which they liked ‘what their country had become’, and felt like a 
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stranger in their own country.  They were also asked about their feelings of remorse and/or 
regret about changes in the area in which they currently lived, and that in which they had 
grown up.  These items were factor analysed to form one battery of items.  The KMO was 
.837, and the eigenvalue was 3.450.  The factor loadings ranged from .609 to .711.  
The Economic Nostalgia battery (Figure Six) asked four questions, all of which contained an 
element of change or transformation to them.  These items focused on the extent to which 
the profit motive now dominates social life, the extent to which market forces are 
responsible for growing economic inequalities, feelings of loss when some of the major 
employers of the 1920s-1960s declined (often coming to a head most visibly in the 1970s 
and 1980s) and the feeling of a loss of community spirit since the 1980s. These items were 
factor analysed to form one battery of items.  The KMO was .722, and the eigenvalue was 
2.105. The factor loadings ranged from .585 to .632. 
 
FIGURE SIX: ECONOMIC NOSTALGIA BATTERY 
Item Wording Loadings 
The profit motive has come to dominate all aspects of our society. .607 
The reliance on market forces has increased the gap between rich and poor. .632 
It feels to me like the country lost something when coal mines, steel mills and 
shipyards closed. 
.585 




The Political Nostalgia battery (Figure Seven) focused more directly on the Thatcher 
governments and the record, asking items about their impact on the quality of life, the 
extent to which they did ‘damage to communities around here’ and were responsible for 
the problems faced by the UK in the present (2019). These items were factor analysed to 
form one battery of items. The KMO was .765, and the eigenvalue was 2.612. The factor 
loadings ranged from .889 to .908.  
FIGURE SEVEN: POLITICAL NOSTALGIA BATTERY 
Item Wording Loadings 
Margaret Thatcher’s governments decreased the quality of life for many 
ordinary people.  
.908 
Margaret Thatcher’s governments did a lot of damage to communities 
around here.  
.889 




Modelling ‘Behavioural Thatcherism’ 
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Recall that our modelling strategy had two stages to it.  First, we ran multiple linear 
regressions (controlling for a range of appropriate socio-demographic variables), before 
then moving to explore the relationships between the main concepts using a structural 
equation model.6  This allowed us to model the processural relationships between these 
variables.  Table Two summarises the results of the first stage of this modelling procedure.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
We ran four models, starting with a very basic model which contained only demographic 
variables.7  As is clearly seen, gender and urban/rural dwelling were not statistically 
significantly related to Behavioural Thatcherism (and this did not change as the modelling 
progressed).  Age, however, was found to be statistically significant (with younger people 
reporting greater levels of Behavioural Thatcherism).  We found similarly significant results 
for: self-identified religiosity (with those identifying as religious reporting greater levels of 
Behavioural Thatcherism); household income (with wealthier households exhibiting more 
Behavioural Thatcherism); and higher education (with those with a University degree also 
exhibiting more Behavioural Thatcherism).  Not being the chief income earner was also 
found to be associated with Behavioural Thatcherism in Model I, but did not reach statistical 
significance thereafter.  
The next model introduced neo-liberal and neo-conservative values into the model.  The 
first of these was always statistically significantly associated with Behavioural Thatcherism, 
whilst the second became progressively more statistically significantly associated with 
Behavioural Thatcherism as the modelling progressed.  The key thing to note about these 
two variables is the direction of their relationship with Behavioural Thatcherism.  Perhaps 
unremarkably, neo-liberalism was positively associated with behavioural Thatcherism.  
More intriguingly, the relationship was negative for neo-conservativism (the more neo-
conservative one’s value-set the less likely one was to report Behavioural Thatcherite 
practices).  Model III introduced one further variable: general Thatcherite Beliefs.  This, too, 
proved statistically significantly and was associated positively with Behavioural Thatcherism.  
Finally, Model IV introduced the three measures of nostalgia.  Of these, only one, Political 
Nostalgia was (positively) associated with Behavioural Thatcherism.  
Further modelling, using first neo-liberalism and then neo-conservativism as the dependent 
variables, found that Thatcherite Beliefs, Social Nostalgia, Economic Nostalgia and Political 
Nostalgia were all positively and significantly associated with these two measures.  Since 
                                                          
6 Because of the positive skew of the dependent variable (see Table 1), we also ran a version of the final model 
(model IV) with the dependent variable transformed. We performed a log10 transformation on the dependent 
variable. This required us to add 1 to each score since log10 transformations cannot be calculated on 0 scores. 
The final model using the log10 transformed dependent variable was not substantively different from the 
untransformed dependent variable. We have report the untransformed model in Table 2.     
7 These were coded as follows: Gender: 1 = male, 2 = female; Urban/Rural: 1 = urban, 2 = rural; Religiosity: 1 = 
Extremely Religious, 7 = Extremely Non-religious; Chief Earner: 1 = yes, 2 = no; Household Income: 1 = Below 




these models replicate some of what we discuss below (when describing the results of the 
structural equation modelling) we do not present these findings in full here.   
 
Developing a structural equation model of Behavioural Thatcherism 
Let us turn now to the structural equation modelling.  Here we drop the socio-demographic 
variables (since they are not all suitable for linear modelling) and focus on the main 
conceptual variables outlined above.  Our model is summarised in Figure Eight.  Following 
the multiple linear regression modelling reported above, we specify regression paths from 
Thatcherite Beliefs, Social Nostalgia, Economic Nostalgia and Political Nostalgia to both neo-
liberal and neo-conservative value-sets.  We also specify regression paths from Thatcherite 
Beliefs and both neo-liberal and neo-conservativism values to Behavioural Thatcherism.  
Error terms for the four variables (indicated by e1 to e7 in circles in Figure Eight) dealing 
with Thatcherite Beliefs and the various forms of nostalgia were allowed to co-vary, as were 
those for neo-liberalism and neo-conservativism.8  
 
[FIGURE EIGHT HERE] 
 
Our model reveals statistically significant paths at p < .000 between all of the variables we 
include (with the exception of the Political Nostalgia -> neo-conervativism path).  The model 
fits the data well (with a CFI of .995, and a RMSEA of .064).  It suggests that Thatcherite 
Beliefs are directly related to Behavioural Thatcherism (with a coefficient of .11), neoliberal 
values (.69) and neo-conservativism (.27).  Our three measures of nostalgia operate in 
interesting ways.  Social Nostalgia is positively associated with both neo-liberal values and 
(more strongly) neo-conservative values (with coefficients of, respectively, .18 and .46).  
Economic Nostalgia, however, is negatively associated with neo-liberalism (-.23) and yet 
positively associated with neo-conservativism (.14).  This suggests that those with higher 
levels of Economic Nostalgia (those reporting themselves uncomfortable with increases in 
the dominance of the market and the loss of heavy industry and some of those things 
associated with it) were less likely to support the ‘neo-liberal project’ – yet, intriguingly, 
more likely to support authoritarian attitudes (see Figure Three).  Conversely, and very 
much as expected, those reporting higher levels of Political Nostalgia also expressed neo-
liberal values (.22, so those who disagreed that, for example, Margaret Thatcher’s 
governments did a lot of damage to communities around here, were also more likely to 
score highly on the neo-liberal values measure).  This mirrored the relationship with neo-
conservativism (-.05) – agreeing that Thatcher’s governments had damaged local 
communities was associated with lover levels of neo-conservativism.   
                                                          
8 Allowing error terms to co-vary is common practice for items (or, as in our case) groups of items which are 
asked in blocks of survey questions, and where respondents might have wrongly interpreted the direction of 
the answer scale (Arbuckle and Wothke, 1999:150).  
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Turning now to the relationship between neo-liberalism and neo-conservativism, we again 
see a bifurcation – with Behavioural Thatcherism positively associated with neo-liberalism 
(.18) and yet negatively associated with neo-conservatism (-.12). 
Interactions with Voting Patterns 
One obvious further extension of the modelling concerns the extent to which Economic 
Nostalgia and neo-liberal/neo-conservative dispositions interact to shape voting patterns at 
the 2017 General Election and, perhaps more interestingly, the 2016 EU Referendum.  Here 
we find that those who scored highly on neo-conservativism and Economic Nostalgia (in the 
top 50% of each scale), and yet low on neo-liberalism (in the bottom 50% of the scale) – a 
category arguably very close to those typically referred to as ‘left behind’ in the literature on 
Brexit9 – were significantly more likely to vote for Brexit (64%) than those who did not (49%, 
p <.000).  Yet they were also more likely than the rest of the sample to vote for parties of 
the left or centre-left10 (61%, as opposed to 52% for the rest of the sample, p <.000).  Brexit, 
on this reading, would appear to be a behavioural consequence of neo-conservatism and 
economic nostalgia.   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
What are we to make of these intriguing and illuminating results?   
Let us deal, first, with the finding that neo-liberalism and neo-conservativism have very 
different relationships to Behavioural Thatcherism.  One might argue that this is a 
consequence of our empirical operationalisation of the concept of Behavioural Thatcherism, 
which relates principally to market-conforming or embracing behaviour (see Figure One).  
That might suggest that neo-conservative aspects of Behavioural Thatcherism have been 
underplayed in our analysis.  There is something to this.  But, in the end, we do not support 
this interpretation.  It is hard to imagine how one might treat as individual behaviours those 
aspects most commonly associated with neo-conservativism (such as authoritarianism and 
respect for tradition and the rule of law).  And that, in turn, suggests an alternative 
interpretation: namely, that neo-conservativism is less about one’s own behaviours and 
rather more about underlying attitudes to (and moral evaluations of) the behaviours of 
others.  It is other people (or perhaps all people) who ought to obey the law, respect 
‘traditional values’, refrain from under-age or out of wedlock sexual relations, avoid divorce, 
believe in ‘Christian values’ or ‘support our troops’.  Neo-conservativism is then perhaps 
rather more inherently attitudinal than it is behavioural (or at least demonstrably 
behavioural).   
Neo-liberal value-sets, on the other hand, do lend themselves rather more easily to 
operationalisation in both social science surveys and the everyday lives of people.  
Neoliberalism, as we have argued before, promotes self-reliance and individual choice-
                                                          
9 In our survey, this categorisation amounted to 897 respondents, or 15.5% of the whole sample.   
10 Left-leaning parties were defined as Labour, The Liberal Democrats, the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Greens. 
The opposite (right-leanings parties) were defined as the Conservative Party and UKIP.   
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making and privileges the market as the site in and through which to ‘solve’ day-to-day 
problems such as choices over schooling (whether by using league tables, or relying on 
private providers), healthcare, business ownership and the acquisition of private assets 
(stocks, shares, investment vehicles and, indeed, second homes).   
This potentially provides us with clues as to why it is that neo-liberalism (and not neo-
conservatism) has become perhaps the key organising concept in the critique of 
contemporary society.  Neo-liberalism is much easier to ‘see’ empirically (recall that Dardot 
and Lavel’s (2013) critique is about neo-liberal society and the people it creates) than are 
the ‘hidden’, less visible, ‘internal’ attitudes of neo-conservativism.   
Finally, our results point to an intriguing observation which we intend to explore in much 
greater empirical depth in future research drawing on this data set.  For they suggest the 
presence in Britain, since the Thatcher governments, of a small but significant body of 
opinion that is both staunchly neo-conservative in its value-set and economically nostalgic 
(in decrying the long standing process of deindustrialisation and the community decay it 
associates with that) on the one hand and yet also profoundly resistant to neo-liberalism on 
the other.  This combination of attitudinal factors is very close to that which many 
commentators see as underpinning the vote for Brexit – the famous ‘left behind’ of neo-
liberal globalisation and global neoliberalism (Goodwin & Milazzo 2017; Hopkin 2017; see 
also Hay 2019).  Our analysis shows that economic nostalgia allied with neo-conservative 
values and opposition to neo-liberalism are a powerful predictor of support for Brexit, 
lending a further empirical credence to the ‘left behind’ thesis (in a small but nonetheless 
significant part of the electorate).  They also suggest that Thatcherism’s success was, in 
effect, to manage to prise a portion of the economically nostalgic post-industrial working 
class from Labour on the basis of its neo-conservatism.  The modern Conservative Party 
appear to have lost that skill.  The result, to some extent and for now, at least, is the rise of 
a new populism and the fracturing of the British party system.  That is a most intriguing, if 
perhaps rather unexpected, potential legacy of Thatcherism.   
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